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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal from an order granting a writ of habeas 
corpus to William Fiore, a state prisoner in Pennsylvania. 
The district court granted the writ after concluding that 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania violated Fiore's 
constitutional rights by failing to apply one of its decisions 
retroactively. Because state courts are under no 
constitutional obligation to apply their decisions 
retroactively, we reverse. 
 
I. 
 
William Fiore owned and operated a waste disposal 
facility in Elizabeth Township, Pennsylvania, during the late 
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1970s and early 1980s. In 1983, after the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Resources (DER) discovered 
that hazardous wastes were seeping into a monitoring pipe 
underneath the facility, Fiore instructed the facility's 
general manger, David Scarpone, to alter the flow of the 
monitoring pipe. The alteration allowed hazardous wastes 
to be deposited surreptitiously in a nearby tributary while 
clean water flowed through the inspected portion of the 
monitoring pipe. State officials discovered the alteration in 
1984 and brought criminal charges against Fiore and 
Scarpone under the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management 
Act (SWMA), 35 P.S. SS 6018.101. 
 
Among other things, the criminal information charged 
that Fiore and Scarpone operated a hazardous waste facility 
without a permit in violation of 35 P.S. S 6018.401(a), a 
second degree felony under 35 P.S. S 6018.606(f). Although 
the state did not dispute the fact that Fiore had obtained a 
permit from the DER, Supp. App. at 51, the state proceeded 
on the theory that Fiore and Scarpone "so altered the 
monitoring system and so significantly departed from the 
terms of the permit that the operation of the hazardous 
waste facility thereafter was an unpermitted operation." Id. 
at 52. Following a jury trial, Fiore and Scarpone were 
convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a 
permit in violation of SS 401(a) and 606(f). After a separate 
non-jury trial involving additional allegations of 
unauthorized activities, Fiore again was convicted of 
operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in 
violation of SS 401(a) and 606(f).1  On April 10, 1987, the 
Court of Common Pleas sentenced Fiore to a prison term of 
two and one-half to five years, plus ten years' probation, for 
the jury-trial conviction under SS 401(a) and 606(f). The 
court then sentenced Fiore to a consecutive prison term of 
two and one-half to five years, plus ten years' probation, for 
the non-jury-trial conviction under SS 401(a) and 606(f). In 
addition, the court imposed a fine of $100,000 for each 
conviction under SS 401(a) and 606(f). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Between his two trials, Fiore was convicted of sixty counts of 
violating 
the SWMA and other statutes. Only the S 401(a) convictions are at issue 
here. 
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On direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 2 
Fiore contended that there was insufficient evidence to 
sustain his convictions under SS 401(a) and 606(f) in light 
of the fact that he possessed a permit to operate a 
hazardous waste facility. The Superior Court rejected this 
argument and adopted the trial court's reasoning that 
Fiore's actions "represented such a significant departure 
from the terms of the existing permit that the operation of 
the hazardous waste facility was `un-permitted.' " App. 51, 
63-64, 125-26. Fiore's convictions became final when the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his petition for 
allowance of appeal on March 13, 1990. 
 
More than a year after Fiore exhausted his direct appeal, 
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed 
Scarpone's conviction under SS 401(a) and 606(f). Scarpone 
v. Commonwealth, 596 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1991). The Commonwealth Court concluded that Scarpone 
could not be convicted of operating a hazardous waste 
facility without a permit when Fiore actually possessed a 
permit for the facility. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the 
court explained that it would have been more appropriate 
to charge Scarpone with violating the terms of a permit, a 
first-degree felony under the SWMA. Id. The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania granted review in Scarpone's case, and 
Fiore filed a petition for extraordinary relief asking the 
Supreme Court to consolidate his case with Scarpone's. 
After denying Fiore's petition, the court affirmed the 
reversal of Scarpone's conviction. Commonwealth v. 
Scarpone, 634 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa. 1993). The court 
explained: 
 
       The alteration of the monitoring pipe here was 
       execrable and constituted a clear violation of the 
       conditions of the permit. But to conclude that the 
       alteration constituted the operation of a new facility 
       without a permit is a bald fiction we cannot 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. While the Commonwealth Court normally exercises jurisdiction over 
appeals from SWMA convictions, Fiore successfully petitioned to have his 
case transferred to the Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 
A.2d 1185, 1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). As a result, Fiore and Scarpone 
had their appeals heard by different courts. 
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       endorse. . . . We agree with the Commonwealth Court 
       that the statutory language here cannot be stretched to 
       include criminal activities which clearly fall under 
       another statutory section or subsection. The 
       Commonwealth Court was right in reversing Mr. 
       Scarpone's conviction of operating without a permit 
       when the facility clearly had one. 
 
Id. 
 
Following the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision 
in Scarpone, Fiore again sought extraordinary relief, and 
again his application was denied. Fiore then filed a petition 
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act 
(PCRA), 42 P.S. S 9541, claiming that what he was "charged 
with having done is not a crime as decided by the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania on these very facts." Supp. App. at 
14. The Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court 
both denied Fiore's petition on the ground that 
Pennsylvania law does not allow post-conviction relief in 
cases where the alleged error was litigated on direct appeal. 
Supp. App. at 22; Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 A.2d 1185, 
1192-93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In addition, the Superior 
Court refused to apply the Scarpone decision retroactively 
based on state-law principles of retroactivity. Id. at 1193. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania subsequently denied 
Fiore's petition for allowance of appeal from the Superior 
Court's decision. 
 
Fiore then filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas 
corpus. The petition presented two issues: 
 
       1. Whether Mr. Fiore was convicted, sentenced and 
       incarcerated on the basis of facts which did not 
       establish each element of the crime charged. 
 
       2. Whether the Pennsylvania Courts have denied 
       Petitioner William Fiore due process and equal rights 
       by refusing to grant him the benefit of the 
       Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Scarpone. 
 
Report of the Magistrate Judge at 11-12. 
 
The magistrate judge concluded that the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania's "failure to grant relief pursuant to 
Scarpone . . . served to deny Fiore due process of law and 
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equal protection of the law." Id. at 20. Accordingly, the 
magistrate judge "recommended that Fiore's petition for [a] 
writ of habeas corpus be granted" and "further 
recommended that the grant of the writ should be 
accomplished through the retroactive application of" 
Scarpone. Id. at 22. The district court adopted the report 
and recommendation of the magistrate judge and ordered 
that Fiore be released from the portion of his sentence 
pertaining to both the jury and non-jury trial convictions 
under SS 401(a) and 606(f). 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth challenges the district 
court's conclusion that the federal Constitution requires 
retroactive application of Scarpone. We exercise plenary 
review over this purely legal conclusion. Yohn v. Love, 76 
F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
II. 
 
To be eligible for a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state 
prisoner must show that "he is in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(a).3 Fiore contends that he meets this 
requirement because, under the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania's decision in Scarpone, his conduct does not 
constitute the crime with which he was charged. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged."). Fiore's 
argument would have force had Scarpone been the law in 
Pennsylvania at the time of his conviction. However, 
Scarpone was decided after Fiore's conviction became final, 
and the Pennsylvania courts refused to apply the decision 
to Fiore's case based on state retroactivity principles. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because Fiore filed his S 2254 petition after April 24, 1996, he is 
subject to the additional requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, S 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 
1218-19. However, since we conclude that Fiore cannot succeed on the 
merits of his claim, we need not decide whether Fiore exhausted his 
claim, id. S 104(b), or whether the state courts adjudicated his claim on 
the merits. Id. at S 104(d). 
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Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 A.2d 1185, 1193 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995). Since "it is not the province of a federal habeas 
court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 
questions," Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991), 
Fiore is entitled to relief only if federal law requires 
retroactive application of Scarpone. 
 
The district court held, and Fiore maintains on appeal, 
that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment require retroactive application of 
Scarpone. This conclusion, however, is at odds with the 
Supreme Court's longstanding position that "the federal 
constitution has no voice upon the subject" of retroactivity. 
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 
U.S. 358, 364 (1932). See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 
642 (1984); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 
(1982). While the Court has concluded that some federal 
criminal decisions should apply retroactively, see Davis v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974); United States 
v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971), 
it has made clear that state courts are under no 
constitutional obligation to apply their own criminal 
decisions retroactively. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 
23-24 (1973). Thus, just as the Supreme Court has 
fashioned retroactivity rules for the federal courts based on 
principles of judicial integrity, fairness, andfinality, see 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 304-310 (1989), the state 
courts are free to adopt their own retroactivity rules after 
independent consideration of these and other relevant 
principles. As the Supreme Court explained in Sunburst Oil: 
 
       A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent 
       may make a choice for itself between the principle of 
       forward operation and that of relation backward. . . . 
       The alternative is the same whether the subject of the 
       new decision is common law or statute. The choice for 
       any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy 
       of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its 
       origin and nature. We review not the wisdom of their 
       philosophies, but the legality of their acts. . . . [W]e are 
       not at liberty, for anything contained in the constitution 
       of the United States, to thrust upon those courts a 
       different conception of the binding force of precedent or 
       of the meaning of judicial process. 
 
                                7 
  
287 U.S. at 364-66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that 
federal courts not require retroactive application of state 
judicial decisions, this court has refused to require 
application of new state decisions in habeas proceedings. In 
Martin v. Warden, Huntingdon State Correctional Institution, 
653 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1981), the petitioner claimed that the 
trial court's jury instructions misstated the requirements of 
the Pennsylvania felony-murder rule. Id. at 810. Although 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected Martin's 
argument on direct appeal, it subsequently interpreted the 
felony-murder rule in a manner that cast doubt on the 
charge given in Martin's case. Id. at 810-11. We rejected 
Martin's argument for retroactive application of the new 
decision, stating: 
 
       Even were [the new decision] to be given retroactive 
       effect . . . it would not be the responsibility of a federal 
       court to apply this newly formed state decisional law to 
       a state conviction obtained almost a decade ago. 
       Martin's remedy on such a claim is not in this court. 
       Therefore, under the then-existing Pennsylvania law of 
       felony murder, the judge adequately charged the jury 
       . . . . 
 
Id. at 811 (emphasis added). Accord Houston v. Dutton, 50 
F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 1995) (denying habeas relief to a 
state prisoner because "[n]o federal issues are implicated 
and no federal question is presented in determining 
whether a change in state law is to be applied 
retroactively"). In light of this court's decision in Martin, as 
well as the Supreme Court's rulings in Sunburst Oil and 
Wainwright, we must reject Fiore's argument that the 
constitution requires retroactive application of the Scarpone 
decision. 
 
Our conclusion is not altered by Fiore's reliance on Davis 
v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). In Davis, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a S 2255 petition filed by a federal 
prisoner who had been convicted under the Selective 
Service Act for failing to comply with an induction order. 
On Davis' direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit had concluded 
that his induction order was valid and that he could be 
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prosecuted for failing to comply with the order. In a 
subsequent case, however, the same court found that an 
induction order issued under "virtually identical" 
circumstances was "illegal and created no duty on[the 
defendant's] part to report for induction." Id. at 339-40. 
Davis filed a S 2255 petition based on the new Ninth Circuit 
decision, and the Supreme Court held that Davis raised a 
cognizable claim. The Court explained: 
 
       If [Davis'] contention is well taken, then[his] conviction 
       and punishment are for an act that the law does not 
       make criminal. There can be no room for doubt that 
       such a circumstance inherently results in a complete 
       miscarriage of justice and presents exceptional 
       circumstances that justify collateral relief under 
       S 2255. 
 
Id. at 346-47 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
 
Based on Davis, Fiore contends that he is entitled to 
retroactive application of the Scarpone decision. However, 
Fiore's argument fails to account for the fact that Davis 
concerned the interpretation of a federal, not state, statute. 
Section 2255 allows federal prisoners to assert habeas 
claims if their confinement is "in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. S 2255 
(emphasis added). Since Davis claimed that his conviction 
resulted from an improper construction of a federal statute, 
the Supreme Court allowed him to seek relief without 
alleging a violation of the Constitution. See Davis 417 U.S. 
at 342-346 (relying solely on the "or laws" language of 
S 2255). Fiore, by contrast, must allege a violation of the 
Constitution since there is no federal statute at issue in his 
case. Given that the Davis Court never mentioned a 
constitutional basis for its decision, and given that the 
Supreme Court explicitly has held that the Constitution 
does not require retroactive application of state criminal 
decisions, Wainwright, 414 U.S. at 23-24, we reject Fiore's 
contention that he has a due process right under Davis to 
have the Scarpone decision applied retroactively.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In holding that the Davis retroactivity rule is not required by the Due 
Process Clause, we join several other circuits. See Young v. United 
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We likewise are unconvinced by Fiore's equal protection 
argument. Fiore maintains that Pennsylvania is treating 
him differently from Scarpone with respect to his 
"fundamentally protected right to liberty." Appellee's Br. at 
17-18. Admittedly, this argument has intuitive appeal: Fiore 
and Scarpone were tried together for the same crime, 
convicted on the same facts, and the Pennsylvania courts 
have concluded that Fiore can be imprisoned while 
Scarpone must be released. Nevertheless, Fiore's equal 
protection claim cannot be reconciled with the Supreme 
Court's retroactivity jurisprudence. While the Court has 
recognized that "the principle of treating similarly situated 
defendants the same" should be considered in shaping 
federal retroactivity rules, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
304 (1989) (plurality), the Court never has tied application 
of this principle to the Equal Protection Clause. In fact, the 
Teague rule itself -- which largely denies the benefit of new 
constitutional rules to defendants on collateral review, id. 
at 310 -- inevitably results in the differential treatment of 
defendants who, while convicted at the same time, exhaust 
their direct appeals at different times. Were we to accept 
Fiore's equal protection argument, we would be casting 
doubt on Teague and its progeny. Moreover, we would be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
States, 124 F.3d 794, 799 (7th Cir. 1997); Hohn v. United States, 99 
F.3d 892, 893 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted on other grounds, 118 S. Ct. 
361 (1997); Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 
We note that the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Davis in Bousley 
v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998). Bousley involved a 
federal prisoner who filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 seeking 
retroactive application of the Supreme Court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c)(1) in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). The 
Bousley Court held that Bailey's interpretation of S 924(c)(1) was fully 
retroactive, explaining that "under our federal system it is only 
Congress, 
and not the courts, which can make conduct criminal." Bousley, 118 S. 
Ct. at 1610. See also id. at 1612 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Bailey "did 
not change the law. It merely explained what S 924(c) had meant ever 
since the statute had been enacted."). Because the Bousley decision 
rested on the Supreme Court's understanding of the balance of power in 
the federal system, it differs critically from the current case, which 
involves a state court's refusal to give retroactive effect to a judicial 
interpretation of a state statute. 
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carving out an exception to the rule that the "the federal 
constitution has no voice upon the subject" of retroactivity. 
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 
U.S. 358, 364 (1932). See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 
642 (1984); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 
(1982); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23-24 (1973). 
Since it is not the role of this court to second guess the 
decisions of the Supreme Court, we reject Fiore's claim that 
the Equal Protection Clause requires the Scarpone decision 
to be retroactively applied. 
 
In sum, we conclude that neither the Due Process Clause 
nor the Equal Protection Clause mandates retroactive 
application of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision 
in Scarpone. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's 
grant of a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
When a decision providing a new interpretation of a state 
criminal statute is not made fully retroactive, some 
defendants convicted prior to the new interpretation will 
almost always continue to suffer the consequences of a 
conviction based on conduct that would not constitute a 
crime under the new interpretation, and that is the fate 
that has befallen Fiore. His situation is particularly striking 
because the new interpretation was handed down by the 
state courts in his co-defendant's appeal, which happened 
to follow a different procedural track. However, any 
relaxation of the Pennsylvania rules regarding retroactivity 
due to the particular circumstances present in this case 
must come from the Pennsylvania courts or the governor. 
Although we might be inclined to grant relief if it were 
within our power, the limitations of our authority under the 
habeas corpus statute prevent us from doing so. 
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